A formula is derived for the probability that a "random" m·by·n two·person noncooperative game has an equilibrium· point solution in pure strategies. The limit of thi s probability as III , n ..... 00 is shown to be l·l/e. The probability is tabulated for III, n'" 10.
Introduction
The concept of a mixed strategy, i.e., a probabilistic mixture of alternative courses of action, is of great theoretical importance in the mathematical analysis of conflict situations ("games"). The reason is related to the way in which "solutions" of a game are defined; the typical situation is that the theory guarantees that a game has a solution in terms of mixed strategies, but not necessarily in unmixed or "pure" strategies.
In many prospective applications, however, the introduction of mixed strategies appears dubious at best, e.g., because adoption of such a strategy as modus operandi is simply not accept· able to the decision·maker concerned. This may for example reflect a natural identification of "probabilities" with "limiting relative frequencies of outcomes in indefinitely long sequences of repetitions of identical situations." For a decision-maker constrained to function in an everchanging environment, the notion of such sequences of perfect repetitions may be intolerable even as a hypothetical construct.
Whatever the reason , this distaste for mixed strategies leads naturally to the question of assessing the likelihood that a game chosen "at random" will in fact possess a solution in pure strategies. Attention will be restricted here to noncooperative games with just two players; exten· sion of the results to the case of more than two players would be desirable, but at present is obstructed by combinatorial complications.
The underlying model is formulated in section 2. Section 3 contains the derivations of two alternative formulas, (3.8) and (3.9), for the probability that a random two-player game (with a specified number of pure strategies for each player)fails to possess a solution in pure strategies.
It is natural to inquire about the limiting behavior for large games, those in which both players have many alternative courses of action. In section 5 it is shown that the probability of a solution in pure strategies for large games is surprisingly far from negligible, in fact converging to l-l/e= 0.632+. This is in sharp contrast with the situation when attention is restricted to games in which the players' interests are in direct conflict; for such games, as is shown in section 4, the analogous limiting probability is zero.
These observations suggest that it may be worthwhile to attempt to define a measure C of the degree of "direct conflict" implicit in a given game, and to investigate the probability of a solution in pure strategies for a game chosen "at random" among those with a given value of C. One such measure is the fraction of pairs of game outcomes for which the two players' preferences run in opposite directions. With this measure, section 4's results show that the limiting probability for large games is 0 if C= 1, and 1 if C=O; there is clearly an interesting intermediate range to be filled in.
Formulation
A 2·player noncooperative game, in which Players 1 and 2 have m and n pure strategies respectively, can be represented by two real m X n matrices Al and A2• The entries AI (i, j) and A2 (i, j) are the respective payoffs to Players 1 and 2 if Player 1 selects his ith pure strategy and Player 2 selects his jth.
The solution concept to be employed is the customary Nash equilibrium point (abbreviation: EP); the pair (i , J) is an EP of the game if Al (i, j) is a maximal entry of the jth column of A I, and A2 (i, j) is a maximal entry of the ith row of A2. That is, if Player 1 tentatively selects his ith strategy and Player 2 his jth, then neither has any incentive to change to another strategy in the absence of a strategy change by the opponent.
Our notion of a "random game" is specified by the following model: (a) the 2mn matrix entries of AI and A2 are independent random variables; (b) the entries of each column of AI have the same continuous cumulative distribution function (possibly differing from column to column); (c) the entries of each row of A2 have the same continuous cumulative distribution function (possibly differing from row to row).
For any particular specification of the distributions in (b) and (c), the quantity we wish to evaluate . . . the probability that the game has an EP . . . is well-defined. The formula for this quantity, derived in the next section, shows it to be independent of the choice of distributions.
For most of what will follow, assumptions (a)-(c) are actually somewhat more restrictive than is necessary. If we define a line to be either a column of Al or a row of A2, then for the most pa~t it suffices to assume that with probability 1 each of the n+ m lines has a unique maximum, whose location is uniformly distributed over the line and is independent of the locations of the maxima in all other lines.
. Derivation
Consider the following events:
D: the 2mn entries of A I and A2 are distinct.
E: the game has an EP.
E(i, j): the game has (i, j) as EP.
E(S): every (i,J)ES is an EP.
Then the desired probability is
;, j (3.1)
Let SA-be the family of all sets S of pairs (i, j) such that S has cardinality k. Then the exclusioninclusion principle gives
Since th e co ntinuity ass umptions imply Pr{D } = 1, this can be rewritte n p"",= 2: (-1)·'+12: {Pr{E (5) n D}:SES,J, (3 ,2)
Consider any 5 E5." say It will be shown to follow , from the definiti on of an EP, that E(5) n D is possible only if (3.5)
expresses E(5) as an intersection of e vents which are independent , since they involve disjoint sets of matrix entry positions. Hence
. .
If tk denotes the cardinality of Tk , then it follows from (3.5) that pmn = 2:
To evaluate tk, note that the set (i" iz, . .• , ik) can be chosen in (7) ways , the set UI , j Z, . . . ,jk)
can be chosen (independently) in (~) ways, and then the two can be paired off in k! ways. Thus the final result is 
For some purposes, the representation (3.8) of qmn as an alternating sum is inconvenient. We therefore derive an alternative formula, whose symmetry in m and n is amusingly nonobvious. This formula could be obtained from (3.8), but it seems more informative to derive it from the underlying model. For the derivation, observe that anyone placement of the n column maxima of A I has probability m -II. To each such placement we can associate the A defined by a; = number of columns of A I with maximum in row i.
The number of placements yielding a particular A is just (n; A).
For anyone placement (of the n column maxima of A I) which gives rise to a particular A, an EP willji:zil to occur iff for each i, the placement of the ith row maximum in A2 is not in one of the a; positions corresponding to a column maximum in AI. The probability of this, for a single i, is sim ply 1 -ad n. Combining these considerations yields (3.9).
Comparison With Direct-Conflict Case
A game is called zero-sum if A 1 + A2 = O. Some years ago the second author observed 2 that the probability, that a random zero-sum game has an EP involving only pure strategies, is given by In particular, "large" zero·sum games (those in which at least one player has many pure strategies) are quite unlikely to have solutions in pure strategies.
It was anticipated that the same conclusion would hold for general games (i.e., not necessarily .6) i. e., th e probability of an EP is in general reduced if attention is restric ted to zero·sum games. The defining c haracteristic of a zero·sum game, A 1+ A2 = 0 , clearly implies that the interests of the two players are in direct conflict. Jordan 3 has defined a broader class of games in terms of a c harac teristic which appears more accurately (less restrictively) to capture the "direct conflict" notion. His condition, on the matrix entries Al (i,j) and A2 (i,j) , is that l I That is, the players have opposite preference orders over the set of possible outcomes (i , j). It is .~ easy to show that formula (4.1) remains valid for Jordan 's cutthroat games, so that (4.3) can be vi e wed as an (intuitively plausible) property of direct-confli ct situations. Before leaving this topic, we s hould consider the opposite case in which the players' interests are exactl y parallel, i. e., ; } s. L. Jordan. Cutthroat Games (A bstract), Bull. Oper. Res. Soc. Amer. 14 (1966), Supplement I , p. 8 -68.
Here a largest entry in A I will necessarily occur in the same position (i,j) as a largest entry in A 2 , so that (i, j) will be an EP, and he nce (in this case) the analog of Pm/l has value 1.
Asymptotic Analysis
In this section we sharpen the inequality (4.S) and show that qm1l~ lie (S.l) so that fo r gam es with ma ny courses of action for both players, Pmn is close to l-l/e= 0.632+. For the proof, rewrite (3 .8) as
so that
(S.3)
Also, set
Let any 0> 0 be given. Since 0 < (h < 1 and L (-I)·)k! is convergent, the same holds for k=O (5.2); since K( /-t ) ~ 00 as /-t ~ 00, for all sufficiently large /-t we have the "tail estimate"
hence, (5.1) is proved.
A Related Limit
The payoff matrices A I and A2 have in common their set of mn "positions" corresponding to the ordered pairs (i, j) . Consider the situation in which first a subset S of m of these positions is chosen "at random, " and then (independently) a subset T of n of the mn positions is chosen. Weare interested in the probability Qlltll that Sand T have no common elements, and also in the comple· mentary probability PlltII = 1-Qmll' If we regard S as the set of positions of row maxima in A 2 and T as the set of positions of column maxima in A I, then we have a version of the situation just described which is constrained, in the sense that the members of S (of T) must lie in distinct rows (columns) and the meaning of "at random" must be understood accordingly. (Our model ascribes zero probability to "ties" for a row or column maximum.) It is readily seen that the analogs of Qmll and Pmn , for this constrained problem, are just qlltll and pmll -But here we will deal with the much simpler "unconstrained" version.
Qmll is quite easy to evaluate, since
The event to which the conditional probability refers occurs if and only if the n elements of Tare all among the mn -m positions comprising the complement of S. Thus or finally
Values of PIIIII are given in table 2. aCalculated by L. S. Joel.
100
I 7 " t, Th e limit of Omll as j-t ~ 00 can be found by applying Stirling's formula, but we prefer the more ele me ntary argument obtained by rewriting (6.1) as Our num e ri cal res ults indi cate th a t th e co nverge nce in (6.5) and (6 .6) is co nsid e rably more rapid than (6.4) and (5.1), to an exte nt not fully explain ed by the conseq ue nce qlll71 < Omn (6.7) of (6.3) and (4.4). It would appear very desirabl e to be able to prove (6.5) directl y. This might provid e the key to verifying the quite plausible conj ecture th at for the p·player case (p > 2), the analog of 011/11
(whi c h arises from a relatively simple co mbinatorial problem) will again yield a good approximation to the analog of qlllll , as well as the same limitin g valu e as /.L ~ 00.
ADDENDUM: M. Pearl (unpublished) has recently s hown that for th e 3-player case , the analog of 011111 has the sa me limit lie as found above for th e 2-player case.
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